Indhu
Product Designer
based in Seattle
Work
LAT
Keye
Misinformation Center
Play
AboutEmail
Resume
LinkedIn

Keye

Subscription Marketplace — From three static screens to a YC-backed company

Keye Hero

TL;DR

Role
Founding Product Designer
Team
5 (2 engineers, 1 PM, 2 designers I hired)
Timeline
2 years (2021–2022)
Impact
0→20K MAUs | $1.5M raised | YC W2024
Key Skills
Product strategy · Design systems · User research · PRDs · Chrome extension · Credit economics

01 — Snapshot

Product
A credit-based marketplace for flexible access to premium tools — Grammarly, Adobe, Otter.ai, MasterClass, Crunchbase, and 150+ others — without long-term subscriptions. ClassPass for digital tools.

My role. Founding (and for most of Keye's life, only) designer. I designed every surface — web, mobile web, Chrome extension — wrote PRDs, ran research, and hired the two designers who replaced me.

Timeline. 2 years (2021–2022): beta to credit system to marketplace to extension to seed funding. After the founding team dispersed, the company pivoted into YC W2024 on the traction we built.

Metrics table placeholder

Impact

• User growth: 0 → 20K+ MAUs in under 12 months
• Engagement: +45% within 3 months
• Trial-to-paid conversion: +32% post monetization
• Catalog & partnerships: 150+ products; 35+ direct partnerships incl. Adobe, Grammarly, Otter.ai
• Partner subscriptions: +44% YoY
• Extension adoption: 60% of users within 3 months
• Login friction: −63% via auto-login

$1.5M pre-seed · $30K in grants and competition wins · Featured in Forbes, BulletPitch, UPenn Venture Lab · Accepted to YC W2024

Hero — the original three Wharton screens beside the final marketplace, mobile web, and extension

02 — The Problem

Premium tools were priced for committed subscribers, not curious explorers

Users created fake emails for free trials, shared passwords in friend groups, even paid for a VPN to unlock cheaper regional pricing. Premium tools like Grammarly ($180/year) and Crunchbase ($600) were priced for committed subscribers, not curious explorers.

"I keep creating new email accounts to get free trials. It's the only way to try things without committing."

ClassPass proved flexible multi-provider access worked; Apple One bundled someone else's services. Neither filled the gap between free trial and full subscription — that gap was Keye's opportunity.

03 — Where I Started: Evidence over Instinct

My job wasn't to execute the founders' instincts but to introduce user evidence into a team moving on momentum

My first task was the purchase flow. Founders had baked in mandatory consent and a feedback survey at checkout — completion dropped 30% there. I moved consent to signup and tested the survey in three placements: email (80% ignored), in-checkout (confused buyers), and a post-access popup, which worked because users had just used the product. Drop-off fell 20% in one sprint.

The hardest call was removing product descriptions after testing showed users scanning, not reading. I led with imagery and a side-by-side price comparison, pre-selecting Keye — some users then bought full subscriptions through us, a behavior we hadn't designed for but kept.

With no research budget, I worked by signal saturation: once the same friction appeared across five or six users, it was real enough to act on.
📸 Image / Video / Figma Embed
Replace with: <img>, <video>, or <iframe> for Figma prototypes
Section: 03 — Where I Started: Evidence over Instinct

04 — The Credit System: From Constraint to Intelligence

The credit cap turned price into a discovery mechanic and shaped the entire partnership strategy

The most important design decision in Keye's history — not for how it looked, but for what it revealed.

Unlimited credits (MVP) removed all intentionality. Users activated HBO, Hulu, and Tubi the same day, exhausting access before people who actually wanted those products could get in.

IMAGE: Unlimited Usage Behavior
FullStory heatmap showing 3+ activations per user same day
Timeline: HBO → Hulu → Tubi within hours

A 200-credit cap changed behavior immediately — users now had a stake, and price became a discovery mechanic. When credits ran low, they explored cheaper products they'd never have clicked.

IMAGE: Credit Cap Interface + Usage Chart
Header showing persistent credit balance (87/200)
Chart: Weekday (professional tools) vs Weekend (entertainment)
Discovery pattern: Low credits → explore cheaper products
The cap revealed exactly which partners Keye could win. Spotify, Netflix, and YouTube declined, seeing us as a threat. Adobe, Grammarly, and emerging brands said yes.

Monetization followed the evidence. We charged $20/month for 200 credits once the mental model was set — conversion rose 32% over beta. We reinforced it with a visible credit balance, onboarding pop-ups, and a How Keye Works page; support requests dropped 74%.

📸 Image / Video / Figma Embed
Replace with: <img>, <video>, or <iframe> for Figma prototypes
Section: 04 — The Credit System: From Constraint to Intelligence

05 — Features Built from Signal

Every feature solved friction that users had already shown us, not friction we imagined

Buy Again
Collapsed three-step repurchase into one tap. The friction wasn't stopping decisions — it was re-litigating ones already made.
Request a Product
In testing, I watched a user scroll four times, give up, and ask if a product existed. We placed a Request card right there. Requests became demand data for partnership pitches — subscriptions grew 44% YoY.
Featured
Mixed products we needed data on with products users requested — research and reward in one slot. Its only job: get users to a product fast.
Referrals
Launched ahead of winter holidays to ride natural gifting behavior — became one of our fastest-growing loops with zero paid spend.
IMAGE: Four Feature Cards
Buy Again (one-tap) | Request (at scroll depth) | Featured (top slot) | Referrals (gift flow)
📸 Image / Video / Figma Embed
Replace with: <img>, <video>, or <iframe> for Figma prototypes
Section: 05 — Features Built from Signal

06 — The Chrome Extension: An 18-Month Problem Solved in Ten Days

The breakthrough was recognizing we should live where the user already is

Users were copy-pasting credentials from Keye into partner sites. Partner integrations were supposed to fix it, but each required engineering investment partners wouldn't prioritize — then our technical co-founder left, taking backend capacity with him.

Watching Honey apply coupons at checkout, I saw it: live where the user already is. I built a Figma prototype that weekend — visit a partner site, extension detects it, auto-fills credentials. We shipped in ten days.

IMAGE: Extension Flow (3 frames)
1. User visits Grammarly.com
2. Extension detects site, shows access popup
3. Auto-fills credentials, user logged in

MVP was deliberately narrow — purchased products only, auto-fill only. Results: 60% installed within 3 months, login friction down 63%, repeat sessions up 41%. V2 added in-extension purchasing, earned by that data.

📸 Image / Video / Figma Embed
Replace with: <img>, <video>, or <iframe> for Figma prototypes
Section: 06 — The Chrome Extension: An 18-Month Problem Solved in Ten Days

07 — Design System: Built for a Team That Didn't Exist Yet

The true measure of the system was that users couldn't tell where my work ended and the next designer's began

I came from architecture, where everything is a parametric component — change the object, every instance updates. I treated the product card the same way, evolving it from a long-description carousel to a compact, partner-neutral frame. Engineering kept asking: can this be a state of the existing component, not a new one? That question kept us reducing instead of adding.

The mature card supported eight states — browseable, active, disabled, Buy Again, Featured, Coming Soon, Leaving Soon — all derived from behavior, none speculative.

IMAGE: Product Card Evolution
One component, eight states shown side-by-side
MVP carousel → Launch compact frame
States: Browseable | Active | Disabled | Buy Again | Featured | Coming Soon | Leaving Soon
Frontend engineering was twelve hours away in Asia. A bug found Thursday in Seattle wasn't fixed until Friday evening — once that left a broken sticky nav visible through an entire weekend of VC testing.

I rebuilt my handoff: annotated docs, precisely named assets, pre-answered edge cases, Saturday-morning overlap sessions. That discipline became the onboarding foundation for the designer I hired — when she took over my features, users couldn't tell where my work ended and hers began.

📸 Image / Video / Figma Embed
Replace with: <img>, <video>, or <iframe> for Figma prototypes
Section: 07 — Design System: Built for a Team That Didn't Exist Yet

08 — Tradeoffs & Hard Calls

Founding-designer roles expand to fill whatever you give them. I learned to define boundaries before the product demanded more than one person could sustainably give

The GIF Decision
I wanted animated onboarding characters; engineering flagged performance. I brought evidence on Lottie's lightweight format — we learned it together, and a better solution won over either original position.
The Influencer Debate
Marketing wanted influencer streams and social mechanics. I reframed it: users came to access tools, not to be entertained. Founders agreed.
The Mobile App Concession
I believed in a native app; founders and investors disagreed on cost. I conceded, and made mobile web thorough enough that it barely cost users anything.
The Mid-Growth Rebrand
Changing palette and typography mid-funnel was risky. We shipped it live — it coincided with a 34% single-month growth spike.
What I'd do differently isn't a product decision — it's role design. Founding-designer roles expand to fill whatever you give them. I learned to define boundaries before the product demands more than one person can sustainably give.

09 — Impact & Reflection

The most important thing a founding designer builds isn't the product. It's the foundation that lets the product grow without being rebuilt from scratch

By year three, the founding team dispersed. The company pivoted into YC W2024 on financial analytics — the marketplace didn't survive, but the research, partnerships, and funding that made YC possible came from what we built.

The credit cap wasn't valuable because it monetized the product. It was valuable because it generated the behavioral data that shaped the entire partnership strategy.

Keye compressed the feedback loop between decision and consequence from months to days. It taught me to treat every decision as a hypothesis — the ones I confirmed without testing were the ones that broke in production.

📸 Image / Video / Figma Embed
Replace with: <img>, <video>, or <iframe> for Figma prototypes
Section: 09 — Impact & Reflection
Next Case Study
LAT
Lifecycle Assessment Tracker
EmailLinkedIn ↗Resume ↗